美國對台灣“戰略模糊”的聲明政策需要改變，宜早不宜遲。

當日本在1941年12月7日轟炸珍珠港時，也同時攻擊了菲律賓，引發在太平洋的第二次世界大戰。這是日本帝國為了追求其大東亞共榮圈，入侵和征服東南亞所做的開幕動作。轟炸機是從當時被日本軍事統治的台灣本島起飛。這是攻擊菲律賓和荷屬東印度（今印度尼西亞）的出發點。整個戰爭期間，在東南亞，台灣持續成為日本軍隊的臨時和主要供應基地，和控制所有通過台灣海峽航運的控制點。美國國務院在當時指出，在遠東地區戰略上，除新加坡以外，沒有別的地方有此控制地位。台灣的地理位置述說著這個故事。

位於中國南海的航道邊緣，台灣定位於中國以西100英哩。向南離菲律賓200英哩，離中國海南島700英哩，離越南和南沙群島900英哩。以北連接到琉球群島，離日本本島700英哩。從歷史上看，台灣舉足輕重的位置離中國沿海和東北亞和東南亞之間，一直為該地區性的大國擔任各種戰略目的，攻守兼備。在當今時代，台灣仍然在地理上是大部分東亞危險點的交集點。（即使遠在朝鮮半島的衝突，也可能被從台灣展開的行動而受到影響）。

借鑒歷史經驗，問題是，對一個在亞洲有潛在性的侵略者來說，今天的台灣是否仍可作為一個寶貴的戰略資產，如同它為1940年的日本時一樣。目前，唯一可威脅本地區和平與穩定的力量，是來自於東北亞的朝鮮民主人民共和國，和其贊助者和保護者，在東北亞和東南亞分別有積極懸而未決的糾紛的中華人民共和國。其中，為北京所聲稱是中國領土不可分割的一部分的台灣，將增強中國在這兩個區域的戰略地位。控制台灣將有利於中國在中國南海的操作，使其能夠更加積極地對付菲律賓，越南，馬來西亞，文萊，來維護其領土和領海主張。

突然之間，中國彎曲伸延的“ 九段線 ” 會變得更加真實，更容易讓北京執行。現在瞄準台灣和美國海軍的1600顆彈道導彈，其中大部分可以被搬移到台灣本島，並重新瞄準於其他東南亞國家的地區和船舶，以及世界商業使用的航道。中國將增強它的有利地位，使南海成為中國自稱它有歷史權利的“中國湖”。

阻塞點

此外，從中國的角度來看，台灣是所謂“第一島鏈”，包括日本，琉球，菲律賓，馬來西亞，印度尼西亞和澳大利亞的關鍵環節之一。北京認為這些島嶼是限制解放軍海軍進入 “第二島鏈” （關島，馬里亞納群島，帕勞島群，並在太平洋中部等小島嶼）之間的航行阻塞點，並防礙從那裡進入遠離中國海岸無障礙的海洋。中國在中國東海的海岸線缺乏能服務在那裡設的海軍基地所需的深水港口。中國的潛艇必須在海面上進行操作，直到它們到達琉球群島附近，才能夠下沈並潛入深海。如果中國控制了台灣，它的潛艇將能容易地從台灣的深水港口出去直達太平洋。他們將可以對日本造成新的危險 – 因為日本的能源和其他原材料都是完全依賴東亞海上航線而來。中國的潛艇進入太平洋的能力增強，也可以對美國第七艦隊，關島，夏威夷，甚至美國西部的海岸造成更大的威脅。此外，一有了範圍廣擴的中國海軍，在某種程度上分散了華盛頓和東京的注意力，使朝鮮魯莽的領導者，能更大膽的直接危及韓國的安全。

從一個純粹的海軍和軍事的角度來看，台灣本島的控制權將為中國構成一個巨大的戰略資產，但是對東南亞和東北亞的地區，以及美國 (http://thediplomat.com/…/u-s-confronts-an-anti-access-world/)將構成威脅。中國對台灣，以及其技術先進的經濟的控制，並且因而能控制進入中國南海的權力，將會對本區域的經濟、外交和政治產生很大的影響。當附近的區域政府，面臨著更強大地位的中國，將有可能產生一連串的層疊效應，使這些區域政府重新估計自身利益。新加坡很可能被嚇倒，轉成更親中國的立場；北部有台灣、南部有新加坡，北京在南海的控制更加鞏固。拒絕讓中國有此資產和好處，顯然有利於東南亞、日本和美國的戰略安全及國家經濟。

然而，第二次世界大戰後一個短暫的期間，即使是當中國本身淪陷在共產黨手上時，華府似乎忽視了台灣的戰略價值。1950年1月，國務卿艾奇遜在他著名的國家新聞俱樂部的演講中，描繪美國在亞洲的安全邊界，但這邊界並不包括台灣或韓國。毛澤東與金日成 – 以及他們的資深合夥人，約瑟夫•史大林 – 把這演講解釋成美國表明不會保衛台灣或韓國。他們因此看到他們擴張計劃的可行性。平壤首先行動，在1950年6月時入侵韓國。杜魯門政府，在這之前，實際上已經註銷了台灣對美國的安全價值，對赤裸的侵略感到震驚，因此決定不能這樣被放置著。它(杜魯門政府) 立即執行一個聯合國安理會的決議，授權使用多邊的武力來保衛韓國。杜魯門總統，擔心其他共產主義在亞洲的擴展，或進一步逆轉；調配第七艦隊阻止中國對台灣有所動作。（此舉也旨在阻止蔣介石嘗試重新點燃中國內戰的企圖，因為自從他們被驅逐出中國，國民黨曾發誓將奪回大陸。）杜魯門的聲明解釋了在冷戰的背景下，美國對台灣的政策所有的戲劇性的轉變：

對韓國的攻擊毋庸置疑是表示共產主義已經超越了使用顛覆來征服獨立國家，而是用侵略和戰爭的手段。它蔑視了聯合國安理會發布的維護國際和平與安全的命令。
在這種情況下，共產黨軍隊若佔領福爾摩沙(台灣)，將會對亞太地區的安全，和對美國軍隊在此地區要履行合法和必要的功能，有直接的威脅。
因此我已命令第七艦隊阻止對福爾摩沙的任何攻擊。也因此，我也呼籲在福爾摩沙的中國政府停止對大陸的所有空中和海上行動。第七艦隊將會確保如此。

所以美國當時明確地致力於台灣對中國侵略的防禦-以及對來自台灣的軍事行動而可能威脅到台灣海峽的穩定。基本上來說，說是要保護蔣介石或甚至保護台灣人，還不如說是因為台灣在東亞所有的地緣政治地位和美國自身的戰略利益。當時負責日本戰後過渡行政當局的道格拉斯•麥克阿瑟將軍，明顯的表達了美國的立場：

我相信如果你輸掉了福爾摩沙，你也就失去了我們沿海防線的關鍵，…從我軍方的觀點來看，菲律賓和日本都將是維持不住的。
從我們的角度來看，如果我們放棄或失去福爾摩沙，我們就幾乎失去了太平洋…我們不需要福爾摩沙作為基地或其他任何東西。但福爾摩沙不應該被落入紅色共黨手中。
如果敵人掌控福爾摩沙，進而掌控太平洋，這將無法估計的增加此海洋被任何潛在的敵人，用來作進攻途徑的危險。

“不沉的航空母艦”

麥克阿瑟後來稱台灣為“一艘不沉的航空母艦”。他的意思很明顯，華府並沒有預想要將台灣作為對中國，或任何其他國家進行攻擊的前進基地。反而，對中國來說，可能被以潛在的戰略資產平台來侵犯台灣和該地區的其他美國利益。1954年，中國砲擊金門，馬祖等島嶼，後來被稱為第一次的台海危機。美國的反應是與在台灣的中華民國（以及與跟北韓戰爭結束後的韓國）進入正式的共同防禦條約。

艾森豪威爾總統描述為何有台灣防禦條約的理由如下：

置於不友善的人手上，台灣和澎湖列島將嚴重的打亂現有的，即使不是很穩定的，在太平洋地區和平所依賴的，道德、經濟、和軍事勢力的平衡。這將會對美國和其他自由國家，在西太平洋島鏈所組成的海洋地理主斡的結構安全，造成裂口。

此外，這種裂口會對此列島屏障的南北交流，中斷了許多重要元素，並損害我們友好國家的經濟生活。

很明顯的，共和黨和民主黨政府都看到了台灣的戰略價值。當時的參謀長這樣說：

福爾摩沙的地理位置，使得，如果福爾摩沙落在對美國不友善的國家手中，它將會在我們防線的中心，構成一個顯著的敵人；離鄰近友好的沖繩和菲律賓只有100、150英哩—比在亞洲大陸的任何一點都更接近。

所以，即使在當美國和中華民國有正式的共同防禦條約時，美國一貫認為台灣最主要的就是作為一個絕對不能讓北京控制住的重要戰略資產，而不是作為一個對付中國或者亞洲其他潛在的對手的攻擊行動的中轉站。這種想法至今未變，但它很可能改變；因為中國最近在東北亞和東南亞的擴張主義政策，威脅了美國的盟國，並且增加了中國和美國對抗的可能性。

1958年的第二次台海危機中，中國恢復了近海島嶼的砲擊。金門，馬祖的防務成為1960年總統競選的一個問題，因為副總統尼克森和參議員約翰•甘乃迪都誓言要保衛台灣，反對中國的侵略。台灣 – 中國和美國 – 中國有關台灣的僵局持續了十五年；在這其間，通過兩黨的政府，第七艦隊也持續在台灣海峽作執法者。在60年代越南戰爭期間，台灣投桃報李，作為一個忠實的盟友，給美國提供後勤，情報和其它支持。

為了發揮對付蘇聯的中國牌，以及為了美國能體面的從越南退出而向北京爭取支持，尼克森總統於1972年向中國的開放顯著地改變了情況。由於尼克森和他的國家安全顧問亨利•基辛格，都太積極地在爭取中國為對抗蘇聯的戰略合作夥伴；他們開始對有關台灣的種種做出讓步，甚至在尼克森訪問中國之前就開始讓步，違反了他們所謂的“現實主義”原則，沒有得到回報就永不放棄。尼克森撤出在台灣海峽的第七艦隊，並開始拆除在台灣所有剩餘的美軍設施。

隨後有了上海公報，北京的“一個中國”原則是說，台灣是中國的一部分，而華盛頓的“一個中國政策”，是說中國和台灣要和平地解決它們的關係。而美台共同防禦條約仍然暫且有效，但在國際社會中，台灣已難逃”悲慘”的命運了。七年之後，卡特政府承認中國的人民共和國，與台灣斷絕正式外交關係，並終止1954年的防衛條約。再次，為了更確定培養與中國的良好關係，在華盛頓的總統府忽略了台灣的戰略價值。

台灣關係法

然而，美國國會對台灣的未來有不同的看法，並通過了台灣關係法：“宣布在該地區的和平與穩定是有利於美國的政治、安全、和經濟，而且是國際關注的問題 ”。該法指出，其進一步的目的是 “清楚地聲明，美國與中華人民共和國建立外交關係的決定，是基於台灣之未來，將以和平的方式來決定的期望上”。

為了阻止中國對台灣使用武力，台灣關係法使美國有義務提供所有必要的防禦性武器給台灣。美國國會認為該法案是有必要的，因為此法案可以撤消一些因卡特總統廢除的，也就是保持了二十五年和平的共同防禦條約而造成的傷害。但是台灣關係法比如鐵一般的防禦條約，保證美國對台灣的防禦的承諾，還差了一截。

批准美國強烈和明確給台灣承諾的機會來了；在1995年，當中國對前李登輝總統訪問美國時，和1996年，台灣第一次總統直選時的反應是，朝台灣島發射導彈，和關閉台灣海峽以及海峽的空域以阻擋世界性的商業通道。在第一個場合，克林頓總統派出了兩個航母戰鬥群通過海峽；這是自從尼克森二十三年前撤出第七艦隊後，美國海軍的第一次越過台灣海峽。中國強烈抗議認為是入侵中國的海域。華府解釋，過境是天氣轉變的結果；而不是簡單地告知北京，根據國際法，美國和其他國家在那裡有充分的權力；所以華府含蓄地承認，中國的同意是必要的。

1995年12月，中國官員直接質問助理國務卿約瑟夫·奈，如果中國攻擊台灣，美國會怎麼做。奈的回應竟然是：“我們不知道，你們也不知道。這將視情況而定”；而不是籍用和加強台灣關係法，說，美國將協助台灣自衛。幾個月後，台灣舉行了首次直接總統選舉，中國發射導彈至台灣的兩側，美國再次展示不滿。而再一次的，克林頓派出一個航母戰鬥群到該地區。但是這一次，北京警告說，任何進入海峽的船舶會遭遇到“一片火海”（這是東北亞地區共產國家以及一個在伊朗的政權所喜愛的威脅）。華府明白此信息，所以不僅僅是當時，再來的十年，船隻都避免通過。

只有當國防部在2006年審查它們的自由航行計劃時，美國海軍才又開始派遣船隻通過台灣海峽，但總是在中國的反對中進行。2007年，繼北京突然取消一個美國親善訪問香港港口的計劃之後，小鷹號航母戰鬥群返回日本時由台灣海峽經過。中國強烈譴責此航程。美軍太平洋司令部的負責人基廷海軍上將回答說 “我們通過台灣海峽不需要中國的批准。當我們需要時 – -更正 – – 當我們想要時，我們將行使我們的自由通行權”。

這些事件表示，不僅是台灣的島嶼具有重要的戰略意義，台灣海峽同時也是；任何跨海峽的衝突都會對海軍和商業的通道產生重大的影響。如果中國控制了海峽兩岸，它將會勒住國際航道的脖子。

新領域

另外，還有一個方面涉及到與台灣的地緣戰略位置有關的，台灣的安全領域 – 就是在人道援助和災難救援的作用，無論是作為一個人道援助和災難救援的接受者和給予者。亞太地區是受到世界上一些最惡劣的天氣和自然災害的地區。當2009年莫拉克颱風襲擊台灣時，美國第七艦隊派出艦艇和飛機來援助台灣人民。2011年，當地震和海嘯摧毀福島時，台灣立即派出救援隊伍和技術人才，是全球對日本的經濟復甦貢獻最大的團體。當菲律賓在2013年遭受颱風海燕的影響時，台灣也迅速地用重大援助作出反應。台灣一貫地回應世界各地的人道援助和災難救援的需要，像2004年印尼的海嘯，2010年海地的地震，2013年西撒哈拉的旱災，還有在亞洲和其他地方的自然災害。

總而言之，從軍事、經濟和人道援助的角度來看，台灣的戰略重要性是明確的，即使在過去的歷史上，美國兩黨的政府有時候都因為他們設定中國政府為更大的目標，而矮化了台灣的戰略重要性。但是，自1980年代，台灣人民從一個全新的領域增加了台灣對西方的價值。台灣的政治反對派，和後來它的領導人，理解到，由於考慮到現實政治的因素，一旦美國官方的外交關係從台北轉向至北京，要拯救其事實上獨立的實體，使此實體能否繼續存活，將依靠於他們的道德和政治價值觀。台灣的分段式、有計劃的轉變到民主社會，意味著華府和西方國家不再有簡單的“現實主義”的理由可以親中 – 也就是說，台灣政策困境僅僅是，看是要選擇一個小的，友好的獨裁，或試圖改善與一個較大的，但是曾經是敵對的關係。如今美國人和日本人可以看台灣作為一個道德和政治的靈魂伴侶，無疑的不同於中國共產黨所統治的國家。

出於同樣的原因，現在的台灣是民主治理的一個中國社會的典範，變得更像是一根骨頭卡在北京的喉嚨，破壞了民主和儒家思想是不相容的神話。1980年代，中國的政治改革的潛在內部壓力升高，最終導致1989年的天安門大屠殺。鑑於有關台灣未來的地緣政治的利害關係，美國在台灣關係法內神聖的承諾為美國承擔了更大的戰略意義。

當美國總統奧巴馬在2011年，澳大利亞議會前，宣布了他所謂美國的“重返亞洲”，他把美國的戰略利益與在該地區成功的民主社會聯繫起來，並承諾“美國力量的所有元素”，以實現“人人安全，繁榮和有尊嚴”。這把台灣和台灣民主的未來放在美國對該地區的道德和政治承諾的戰略中心。無論台灣關係法有沒有明確的承諾防禦，美國的信譽如今與台灣的命運已綁在一起難分難解了。美國對確保台灣持續安全的決心若有任何的減弱，這將會在該地區的朋友以及盟國，並且最關鍵的，在我們的對手當中，顯著的破壞此信譽。

那些爭論說台灣遊戲是得不償失的，其實未能了解其他國家對美國向台灣的承諾有多大的重要，將此承諾視為美國可靠性的指標，萬一這些其他的國家也受到來自中國的提高的強制性壓力或徹底的敵意。他們視美國為對付中國的軍事擴大以及擴張政策為必要的平衡者，而台灣是測試美國的決心的首例。

這就是為什麼美國的“戰略模糊” 政策聲明需要宜早不宜遲的改變。華府對明確地公開為台灣提供防禦性武器和主動地作防衛而做出承諾的拒絕，會在該地區散播疑惑。更糟的是，它鼓勵中國繼續推行它們的，利用調配攻擊型核潛艇和彈道導彈，來威懾、拖延或挫敗任何美國介入對兩岸的衝突，反介入，區域阻絕的戰略。畢竟，自1995年以來，華府曾經表示，視情況而定，它可能會或可能不會保衛台灣。所以北京一直在創造可影響情況的計算。如果美國早在1995年已明確的表示攻擊台灣將肯定的會意味著軍事衝突，甚至與美國的全面戰爭，北京難道還會投入這麼多的國民財富和精力到攻台的策略嗎？不管他們的缺點如何，中國的領導人可沒有要想自殺的念頭。然而，一些專家認為，一個明確的聲明政策的發言是不必要的，是“過時”了。根據該論文，在各種秘密會議中，美國已經毫不含糊地告訴中國，美國承諾會保衛台灣。這樣，他們認為，中國要採取反對台灣行動的念頭已經被約束了。

這個分析有幾個瑕疵。首先，分析美國與中國開戰的，可以關起​​門來進行，而未告知給美國公眾，這是非常令人難以置信的。其次，未進行任何公開的承諾缺乏可信性，正因為美國的威信被削弱了 — 一條秘密紅線是特別細的 [指暗中進行的承諾沒有信用]。第三，中國有興趣地觀察到，在一個簡短而清晰的時刻，美國的戰略政策毫不模糊地展現出來。在2001年4月EP-3事件 發生後，美國小布希總統，喬治·W·布希，被問及，若面臨中國的攻擊，美國會如何保衛台灣；他回答說：“不惜一切代價”。這個明確的聲明使中國的專家震驚不已。白宮和國務院官員趕快“澄清”說，美國的政策並沒有改變。第四，雖然中國領導人時常抱怨美國出售武器給台灣，其實他們明白，華府在武器出售的數量上和品質上已延緩於它的敏感性。台灣始終被否決了他們要求的先進系統：F-16 C/D 型，F-35戰機，以及柴電潛艇。一直都被拒絕。第五，北京有理由懷疑美國對任何與中國嚴重的軍事對抗的意志和持久力。畢竟，中國在韓戰和越戰時已經以第一手的經驗，見識過美國在戰爭中，有限的行為。中國也已觀察到美國的戰略規劃者，在軍力升級時對利用“出口匝道”的嗜好 – 甚至用類似非動能的手段，例如制裁，尤其是對付一個強國時，像對付伊朗的核子計劃，或俄羅斯與烏克蘭的情況。中國的領導人很可能能推算出，即使美國最初先響應中國的行動，而北京表示願意在其核心利益上加劇危機，華府將會是先閃避的一方。

這個問題在台灣2016年選舉臨近時，將成為少理論[多現實]。如果民進黨的候選人似乎有獲勝的合理機會，暫且不提他或她有沒有被看好，北京可能會看到它要和平統一的最後機會，變成遙不可及。到時，如毛澤東以後的中國領導人已有表明過，北京將毫不猶豫地訴諸於武力。這種威脅已被編入中國2005年的，其中說，如果台灣宣告正式獨立，或採取對這一目標的行動，中國將以戰爭來威脅。但是此反分裂國家法更進一步的警告台灣不要採取積極台獨行動：若台灣不按照中國的願望採取行動，它也威脅台灣。反分裂國家法指出：“當。。。和平統一的可能性完全喪失時，為了要捍衛中國的主權和領土的完整，國家將得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施”。換句話說，北京將不接受無論是在法律上和事實上的獨立（台灣目前的狀況），使北京有理由開戰。

然而，反分裂國家法提供了以下對台灣人民的保證：

在使用和執行非和平方式及其他必要措施時…國家會盡最大可能保護台灣平民和在台灣的外國國民的生命，財產和其他合法權利和利益，並減少損失。

所面臨台北和華盛頓的戰略規劃者的終極安全問題，是北京何時會決定和平統一的可能性已完全耗盡，使用武力的時候到了。習近平日前表示，台灣問題不能一代又一代的推遲。中國強烈地偏愛台灣的國民黨政府，視為斷然採取獨派立場的政治反對派，這不是什麼秘密。在2016年的總統選舉中，民進黨目前看來至少有一個機會，能再取回政權。如果這樣的話，到時北京會將決定，台灣已經有足夠長的時間來接受中國共產黨的統治了，它不能接受再繼續四年的拖延和平統一嗎？這個問題的答案將會對該地區的和平與穩定有重大的影響。

—

Joseph A. Bosco [not 林舟; 參考http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ant/joseph/], 美國與中國工作小組的成員，在戰略與國際研究中心任高級研究員。此前，2005-2006他曾在國防部長辦公室擔任中國國家主管幹事。

（英文版）

Taiwan and Strategic Security

The U.S. declarative policy on Taiwan of “strategic ambiguity” needs to change sooner rather than later.

When Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, it also simultaneously attacked the Philippines, triggering World War II in the Pacific. It was the opening salvo in the Japanese Empire’s campaign to invade and subjugate Southeast Asia in pursuit of its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The bombers were launched from the island of Taiwan, which was then under Japanese military rule. It was the jumping-off point for the attacks on both the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). Throughout the war, Taiwan served as the staging area and major supply base that sustained Japan’s armies in Southeast Asia and as the control point for all shipping through the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. State Department at the time stated that strategically no location in the Far East, with the exception of Singapore, occupied such a controlling position. Taiwan’s geography tells the story.

Situated at the edge of the South China Sea’s shipping lanes, Taiwan is positioned 100 miles east of China. To the south it is 200 miles from the Philippines, 700 miles from China’s Hainan Island, and 900 miles from Vietnam and the Spratly Islands. It is linked to the north with the Ryukyu Islands, and lies 700 miles from Japan’s home islands. Historically, Taiwan’s pivotal location off the China coast and between Northeast and Southeast Asia has served a variety of strategic purposes for regional powers, both offensive and defensive. In the contemporary era, Taiwan remains geographically at the intersection of most of East Asia’s danger points. (Even a conflict on the Korean Peninsula could be impacted by operations that might be launched from Taiwan.)

Drawing on historical experience, the question is whether Taiwan would be as valuable a strategic asset to a potential aggressor in Asia today as it was for Japan in the 1940s. The only powers that presently threaten the peace and stability of the region are the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Northeast Asia and its patron and protector, the People’s Republic of China, which has active ongoing disputes in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Taiwan, which Beijing claims as an integral part of Chinese territory, would enhance China’s strategic position in both areas. Controlling Taiwan would facilitate China’s operations in the South China Sea and enable it to assert its territorial and maritime claims even more aggressively against the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.

Suddenly, China’s sweeping “nine-dash line” would become even more real and more easily enforceable by Beijing. Most of those 1600 ballistic missiles now targeting Taiwan and the U.S. Navy could instead be moved to Taiwan itself and re-targeted against the ships and territories of other Southeast Asian states as well as the shipping lanes used by world commerce. China would be in an enhanced advantageous position to make the South China Sea the “Chinese lake” it claims as a historical right.

Choke Points
Further, from China’s perspective, Taiwan is one of the critical links in the so-called “first island chain” that includes Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. Beijing sees the navigational “choke points” between those islands as constraining the People’s Liberation Army’s naval access to the “second island chain” (Guam, the Marianas, the Palau island group and other small islands in the central Pacific) and from there into the open ocean far from China’s shores. China’s coastline in the East China Sea lacks the deep-water ports needed to service its naval bases located there. Its submarines must operate on the surface until they are able to submerge and dive deep when they reach the area of the Ryukus archipelagoes. If China controlled Taiwan, its submarines would have a far easier exit from Taiwan’s deep-water ports into the Pacific. They could present a new danger for Japan – which is totally dependent on the East Asia sea-lanes for its energy and other raw materials. Chinese submarines and an enhanced ability to project power into the Pacific could also present an increased threat to the U.S. Seventh Fleet, Guam, Hawaii, and even the West Coast of the United States. Moreover, to the extent China’s far-ranging navy would distract Washington and Tokyo and embolden North Korea’s already-reckless leader, it could directly endanger the security of South Korea.

From a purely naval and military perspective, control of the island of Taiwan would constitute a huge strategic asset for China and a threat to the region in both Southeast and Northeast Asia as well as to the United States. Chinese control of Taiwan, its technologically advanced economy, and control of the entrance to the South China Sea it would provide would have major economic, diplomatic, and political implications for the region. There would likely be a cascading effect as regional governments recalculate their self-interests in the face of an even more powerfully situated China. Singapore might well be intimidated into a more pro-China position, consolidating Beijing’s control of the South China Sea with Taiwan in the north and Singapore in the south. Denying China that asset and that leverage is clearly in the strategic security and economic interests of the countries of Southeast Asia, Japan, and the United States.

Yet, for a brief period after World War II, Washington seemed to lose sight of Taiwan’s strategic value, even after China itself fell to the Communists. Secretary of State Acheson’s famous National Press Club speech in January 1950 delineated America’s security perimeter in Asia but did not include either Taiwan or South Korea. Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung – as well as their senior partner, Josef Stalin – interpreted the statement as indicating that the U.S. would not defend either country and saw a green light for their expansionist plans. Pyongyang moved first and invaded South Korea in June 1950. The Truman administration, which until then had effectively written off Taiwan’s security value to the United States, was shocked by the naked aggression and determined that it could not be allowed to stand. It organized an immediate U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the multilateral use of force to defend South Korea. The president, fearing additional Communist advances in Asia, further reversed course by deploying the Seventh Fleet to deter a Chinese move against Taiwan. (It was also designed to block an attempt by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to try to re-ignite the Chinese Civil War. The Nationalists had promised to retake the mainland ever since they were expelled from China.) Truman’s statement explained the dramatic shift in U.S. policy on Taiwan in the context of the Cold War:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security.
In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese government on Formosa to cease all air and sea actions against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.

The United States was now explicitly committed to the defense of Taiwan against Chinese aggression – as well as to stability in the Taiwan Strait that might be threatened by military action from Taiwan. The rationale had less to do with protecting Chiang Kai-shek or even the Taiwanese people than with Taiwan’s geopolitical position in East Asia and America’s own strategic interests. General Douglas MacArthur, who was responsible for the postwar transitional administration of Japan, expressed the U.S. position in stark terms:

I believe if you lose Formosa, you lose the key to our littoral line of defense . . . the Philippines and Japan both would be untenable from our military point of view.
[F]rom our standpoint we practically lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa. . . . We do not need Formosa for bases or anything else. But Formosa should not be allowed to fall into red hands.
If the enemy secured Formosa and secured thereby the Pacific Ocean, that would immeasurably increase the dangers of that ocean being used as an avenue of advance by any potential enemy.

‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’
MacArthur later called Taiwan “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.” He meant for China, since it was clear that Washington did not envision Taiwan as a forward base for offensive operations against China or any other power. Instead, it was a potential strategic asset for China that could be used as a platform for aggression against Taiwan and other U.S. interests in the region. In 1954, China shelled the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in what became known as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The U.S. responded by entering into a formal mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan (as well as with the Republic of Korea after the end of its war with the North).

President Dwight D. Eisenhower described the reason for the Taiwan defense treaty as follows:

In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic, and military forces upon which the peace of the Pacific depends. It would create a breach in the island chain of the Western Pacific that constitutes for the United States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in that ocean.

In addition, this breach would interrupt north-south communications between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly to us.

It was clear that both Republican and Democratic administrations saw Taiwan’s strategic value in the same light. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time put it this way:

The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of our defensive perimeter, 100 to 150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly segments–Okinawa and the Philippines–than any point in continental Asia.

So, even at the time when the U.S. and the Republic of China had a formal mutual defense pact, the U.S. consistently viewed Taiwan primarily as an important strategic asset that must not be allowed to fall under Beijing’s control, rather than as a staging point for offensive operations against China or other potential adversaries in Asia. That thinking has carried forward to the current period, but it could well change as China’s recent expansionist policies in Northeast and Southeast Asia threaten America’s allies and increase the likelihood of a China-U.S. confrontation.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 saw a resumption of Chinese bombardment of the offshore islands. The defense of Quemoy and Matsu became an issue in the 1960 presidential campaign as both Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator John Kennedy pledged to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. The Taiwan-China and U.S.-China standoffs over Taiwan continued for the next decade-and–half with the Seventh Fleet serving as the enforcer in the Taiwan Strait, through the administrations of both parties. Taiwan reciprocated as a loyal ally during the 1960s, providing logistic, intelligence, and other support to the United States during the Vietnam War.

The situation changed dramatically with President Nixon’s opening to China in 1972, made in order to play the China card against the Soviet Union and to win Beijing’s support for an honorable American exit from Vietnam. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, were so intent on enlisting China as a strategic partner against the Soviets that they began making concessions on Taiwan even before Nixon visited China –violating their so-called “realist” principles about never giving up something without getting something in return. Nixon withdrew the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait and began removing all remaining U.S. military facilities from Taiwan.

Then came the Shanghai Communique, Beijing’s “one China” principle that Taiwan is part of China, and Washington’s “one China policy” that it is up to China and Taiwan to work out the relationship peacefully. The U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty remained in effect for the time being, but the handwriting was on the wall for Taiwan’s fate within the international community. Seven years later, the Carter administration recognized the People’s Republic of China, severed formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminated the 1954 defense treaty. Once again, Taiwan’s strategic value was ignored by a presidential administration in Washington more intent on cultivating good relations with China.

Taiwan Relations Act

The U.S. Congress, however, had a different perspective on Taiwan’s future and passed the Taiwan Relations Act “to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern.” The Act stated that its further purpose was “to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”

To help deter China’s use of force against Taiwan, the TRA also obligated the United States to provide Taiwan with all necessary defensive arms. Congress considered the Act essential to undo some of the harm caused by Carter’s abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which had kept the peace for a quarter of a century. But it fell slightly short of renewing the iron-clad American commitment to come to the defense of Taiwan that the Defense Treaty guaranteed.

The opportunity to affirm that kind of strong and clear U.S. commitment to Taiwan came when China reacted to a U.S. visit by then-President Lee Teng-hui in 1995 and to Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996 by firing missiles toward the island and closing the Taiwan Strait and the airspace above it to world commerce. On the first occasion, President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carrier battle groups through the Strait, the first time the U.S. Navy had traversed it since Nixon withdrew the Seventh Fleet 23 years earlier. China vehemently protested the incursion into what it considered Chinese waters. Washington, instead of simply informing Beijing that the U.S. and other nations have every right to be there under international law, said the transit was the result of a weather diversion, implicitly conceding that China’s consent was required.

In December 1995, Chinese officials asked Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Nye directly what the U.S. would do if China attacked Taiwan. Instead of invoking and strengthening the Taiwan Relations Act by saying the U.S. would assist Taiwan’s self-defense, Nye’s response was: “We don’t know and you don’t know. It would depend on the circumstances.” A few months later, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election and China showed its displeasure once again by lobbing missiles toward Taiwan, this time straddling both sides of the island. And once again, Clinton dispatched a carrier battle group to the region. But this time, Beijing warned that any ships entering the Strait would find “a sea of fire” (a favorite threat of Northeast Asia Communist regimes as well as the one in Iran). Washington got the message and the ships stayed out – not just then but for the next decade.

It was only when the Defense Department reviewed its Freedom of Navigation program in 2006 that the U.S. Navy began sending its ships back through the Taiwan Strait, always over Chinese objections. On 2007, after Beijing suddenly revoked a scheduled goodwill U.S. port visit to Hong Kong, the Kitty Hawk battle group returned to Japan by going through the Strait. China strongly condemned the passage and Admiral Timothy Keating, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, responded: “We don’t need China’s permission to go through the Taiwan Strait. We will exercise our free right of passage whenever we need to – correct that – whenever we choose to.”

The incidents demonstrate that it is not only the island of Taiwan that is of critical strategic importance, but also the Taiwan Strait. Any conflict across the Strait would have a major impact on both naval and commercial passage. If China controlled both sides of the Strait, it would have a stranglehold on that international waterway.

New Dimension

There is another aspect to Taiwan’s security dimension related to its geostrategic location – its role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, both as a recipient and a provider of HADR. The Asia-Pacific is subject to some of the world’s worst weather and natural disasters. When Typhoon Morakot struck Taiwan in 2009, the U.S. Seventh Fleet sent ships and aircraft to come to the aid of the Taiwanese people. In 2011, when the earthquake and tsunami devastated Fukushima, Taiwan immediately dispatched rescue teams and technical personnel and was the largest financial contributor to Japan’s recovery effort. When the Philippines suffered the impact of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, Taiwan responded quickly with major assistance. Taiwan has consistently responded to HADR needs around the world from Indonesia’s 2004 tsunami, to Haiti’s earthquake in 2010, the Western Sahara’s drought in 2013, and other natural disasters in Asia and elsewhere.

To summarize, Taiwan’s strategic importance from a military, economic, and humanitarian assistance standpoint is clear, even though there have been historical periods when U.S. administrations of both parties have seemed to minimize it for what they saw as the greater goal of accommodating the Chinese government. Since the 1980s, however, the people of Taiwan have added an entirely new dimension to the country’s value to the West. Taiwan’s political opposition, and eventually its leaders, recognized that once official U.S. diplomatic relations had shifted from Taipei to Beijing because of considerations of realpolitik, its salvation as a viable de facto independent entity depended on moral and political values. Taiwan’s phased, planned transition to democracy meant that Washington and the West no longer had the easy “realist” rationale – that is, that the Taiwan policy dilemma was merely a matter of choosing a small, friendly dictatorship or trying to improve relations with a larger, formerly hostile one. Now Americans, and Japanese, could look at Taiwan as a moral and political soul mate, certainly by contrast to a country ruled by the Chinese Communist Party.

For the same reason, Taiwan now became even more of a bone in Beijing’s throat as a model of democratic governance in a Chinese society, undermining the myth that democracy and Confucianism are incompatible. The potential internal pressure for political reform in China increased during the 1980s, culminating in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Given those geopolitical stakes regarding the future of Taiwan, the U.S. commitment enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act took on even greater strategic significance for the United States.

When President Barack Obama announced what he called the U.S. “pivot to Asia” before the Australian parliament in 2011, he linked America’s strategic interests to the success of democracy in the region and pledged “every element of American power” to achieving “security, prosperity, and dignity for all.” That places Taiwan and its democratic future at the strategic epicenter of America’s moral and political commitment to the region. U.S. credibility is now tied inextricably to Taiwan’s fate, with or without an explicit defense commitment in the TRA. Any weakening of American resolve to ensure Taiwan’s continued security would significantly undermine that credibility throughout the region among friends, allies, and most critically, our adversaries.

Those who argue that the Taiwan game is not worth the candle fail to grasp how much weight other countries in the region place on America’s commitment to Taiwan as a bell-weather of U.S. reliability should any of them come under increased coercive pressure or outright hostility from China. They see the U.S. as the necessary balancer to China’s military buildup and expansionist policies and Taiwan is the number one test case of U.S. will.

That is why the U.S. declarative policy of “strategic ambiguity” needs to change sooner rather than later. Washington’s refusal to make an explicit public commitment to not only provide Taiwan with defensive weapons but to come actively to its defense sows doubts in the region. Worse, it encourages China to continue pursuing its anti-access, area denial strategy of deploying attack submarines and ballistic missiles to deter, delay, or defeat any U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. After all, Washington has said ever since 1995 that it might or might not defend Taiwan depending on the circumstances. So Beijing has been creating the circumstances to affect that calculus. Would it have invested so much of its national wealth and effort to an anti-Taiwan strategy if the U.S. had made it clear back in 1995 that an attack on Taiwan would certainly mean military conflict, possibly all-out war with the United States? Whatever their faults, Chinese leaders are not suicidal. Yet, some experts argue that a clear declarative policy statement is unnecessary and “passé.” According to that thesis, China has been told in no uncertain terms in various private meetings of the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan so, they argue, it is already being deterred from taking action against Taiwan.

There are several flaws in that analysis. First, it is highly implausible that a U.S. commitment to go to war with China could be made behind closed doors without the American public being informed. Second, any commitment that is not made publicly lacks credibility precisely because American prestige is not on the line – a secret red line is especially evanescent. Third, China observed with interest what happened when, for one brief shining moment, strategic clarity broke through U.S. policy. After the EP-3 incident in April 2001, President George W. Bush was asked what the U.S. would do to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack; he replied “whatever it takes.” That unambiguous statement sent shock waves through the China specialist community. White House and State Department officials rushed to “clarify” that U.S. policy had not changed. Fourth, much as Chinese leaders complain about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, they understand that Washington has deferred to their sensibilities in both the quantity and quality of the weapons transferred. Taiwan is consistently denied the advanced systems it requests: F-16 CDs, F-35s, diesel submarines. Fifth, Beijing has reason to doubt Americans’ will and staying power in any serious military confrontation with China. After all, China has had first-hand experience facing America’s conduct of limited war in Korea and Vietnam. It has also observed U.S. strategic planners’ penchant for “off-ramps” on the escalatory ladder – even with non-kinetic means like sanctions, particularly against a major power, as in the case of Iran over its nuclear program or Russia over Ukraine. China’s leaders may well calculate that, even if here is an initial U.S. response to a Chinese move and Beijing demonstrates a willingness to escalate the crisis over its core interest, it will be Washington that will blink first.

This question will become less theoretical as Taiwan’s 2016 election approaches. If the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party appears to have a reasonable prospect of winning, let alone if he or she is favored, Beijing may see its last chance at peaceful unification receding out of reach. At that point, as China’s leaders from Mao Zedong on have made clear, Beijing will not hesitate to resort to the use of force. That threat was codified in China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which threatened war if Taiwan declared formal independence or took actions toward that end. But the ASL went beyond warning Taiwan against taking affirmative pro-independence action; it also threatened Taiwan for failing to act in accordance with China’s wishes. It states: “In the event that . . . possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In other words, both de jure and de facto independence (Taiwan’s present status quo) are unacceptable to Beijing and would justify going to war.

However, the ASL provides the following assurance to the people of Taiwan:

In the event of employing and executing non-peaceful means and other necessary measures . . . the state shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses.

The ultimate security question that confronts strategic planners in Taipei and Washington is when Beijing may decide that the possibility for peaceful unification is completely exhausted and that it is time to rely on the use of force. Xi Jinping said recently that the Taiwan question cannot be deferred from one generation to another. It is no secret that China strongly prefers Taiwan’s KMT government over a political opposition that takes decidedly pro-independence positions. In the 2016 presidential election, the DPP presently seems to have at least an even chance of being returned to office. Should that happen, would Beijing decide at that point that it cannot accept continuing to defer peaceful unification for at least another four years and that Taiwan has had long enough to accept the rule of the Chinese Communist Party? The answer to that question will have serious implications for the peace and stability of the region.

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Joseph A. Bosco is a member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously served as China country desk officer in the office of the secretary of Defense from 2005-2006.