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Ko Wen-Je’s Bail Dilemma and the Battle for Party Leadership

  • 2025
  • 世代
  • 國際
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Ko Wen-je, the former Taipei mayor and chairman of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), has long cultivated an image of blunt honesty and pragmatic reform. Yet recent events surrounding his decision to delay bail, followed by his eventual acceptance of bail terms, have raised serious questions about whether his actions match his rhetoric. Critics accuse him of being hypocritical—at first presenting himself as a man unwilling to compromise, only to later concede and pay bail. This perceived inconsistency places Ko at the center of a political storm, where he must simultaneously manage his legal troubles, his relationship with Huang Kuo-chang, and the internal contest for party leadership. At stake is not only Ko’s own political credibility but also the loyalty of his grassroots supporters, often called “Little Grass.”

 

The Symbolism of Refusing Bail

 

Initially, Ko’s refusal to post bail was interpreted by many as a symbolic gesture. By declining to comply, he projected an image of defiance, suggesting that he was being unfairly targeted and that standing firm was a matter of principle. In Taiwanese political culture, such defiance resonates with citizens who are skeptical of judicial impartiality. Refusing bail allowed Ko to frame himself as a victim of political persecution rather than an accused politician.

Yet, symbolism can only go so far. As legal realities caught up with him, Ko eventually accepted bail. This shift gave his opponents ammunition: how could he justify both defiance and compliance without appearing opportunistic? His detractors argued that his stance was never truly about principle but about political theater. For many observers, this inconsistency revealed a gap between Ko’s words and actions—a dangerous liability for a leader who has built his reputation on being “different” from traditional politicians.

 

The Ko–Huang Axis

 

At the same time, Ko must contend with his alliance—and rivalry—with Huang Kuo-chang. Huang, a former legislator and prominent figure of the New Power Party, joined forces with Ko in the hope of broadening the TPP’s appeal. On paper, the two share a reformist outlook and a reputation for challenging the political establishment. However, both are strong personalities with distinct ambitions.

Huang is known for his legal expertise and his sharp attacks on corruption, while Ko thrives on populist charisma and his image as an outsider. Their partnership is fragile, as it balances between complementarity and competition. Huang’s rise within the TPP structure threatens Ko’s dominance, especially at a time when Ko’s legal troubles weaken his authority. For Ko, maintaining leadership requires not only defending himself legally but also managing Huang’s growing influence. If Ko appears indecisive or inconsistent, Huang could emerge as the de facto leader—something Ko is unlikely to accept quietly.

 

Party Leadership Struggles

 

Beyond the personal dynamics, the broader struggle for party leadership looms large. The TPP is still a relatively young party, lacking the deep institutional roots of the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Its strength comes largely from Ko’s personal brand and the “Little Grass” supporters who admire his plainspoken style. However, as the party expands, internal factions inevitably form.

Some members prioritize pragmatic governance and are open to coalition-building with either major party, while others insist that the TPP must remain a truly independent “third force.” Leadership contests within the TPP are therefore not merely about personalities but about direction: Will the party revolve solely around Ko’s charisma, or will it evolve into an institutionalized organization with multiple power centers?

 

The “Little Grass” Question

 

This brings us to the crucial issue: will the “Little Grass” continue to follow Ko? These supporters, often younger voters disillusioned with both the DPP and the KMT, rallied to Ko because he seemed authentic, unpolished, and willing to speak truth to power. They valued his outsider image and his promise to reject the hypocrisy of traditional politics.

But authenticity is fragile. If Ko is seen as playing the same political games as his rivals—pretending to stand firm only to later compromise—his appeal may erode. Already, some “Little Grass” supporters express frustration that Ko’s actions no longer align with his rhetoric. They wonder if he has become just another politician, indistinguishable from the ones he once mocked.

At the same time, loyalty in politics is often tied to identity rather than policy. Many “Little Grass” remain attached to Ko because he represents their rejection of the establishment. Even if disappointed, they may not easily shift allegiance to another leader, particularly since no alternative yet offers the same mix of outsider appeal and organizational visibility. Huang Kuo-chang, while respected, lacks Ko’s populist touch. For now, this gives Ko a degree of resilience: his supporters may grumble, but many will still heed his guidance, at least until a credible alternative emerges.

 

Balancing Acts and Future Prospects

 

Failure in any of these areas could weaken both Ko personally and the TPP as an organization. If his legal troubles deepen, the party risks losing credibility. If Huang gains the upper hand, Ko could find himself marginalized within his own movement. And if the “Little Grass” finally abandons him, the TPP’s grassroots foundation could collapse.

The saga of Ko Wen-je’s bail decision and its aftermath highlights the precarious nature of outsider politics in Taiwan. By first refusing and then accepting bail, Ko exposed himself to charges of hypocrisy that cut to the heart of his appeal. His rivalry-cum-alliance with Huang Kuo-chang further complicates his leadership, as internal party struggles intensify. Most importantly, the question remains: will the “Little Grass” continue to follow Ko’s teachings and guidance, or will disillusionment drive them away?

For now, Ko retains their loyalty, albeit shakier than before. But politics is unforgiving. If Ko cannot reconcile his words with his actions, and if he cannot manage the ambitions of Huang and others within the TPP, the very movement he built may slip from his control. The coming months will reveal whether Ko’s defiance and eventual compromise were tactical missteps or simply another chapter in his unpredictable political journey.

Author: Cathy Lin

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2025-09-07 Cathy Lin

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       北京當局於9月3日舉行抗戰勝利80週年「九三閱兵」,普丁、金正恩等威權領袖齊聚天安門。這場看似紀念活動,實涉及許多層面,核心在於世界獨裁者齊聚與西方民主陣營互別苗頭。閱兵不只是展示武器、科技,所謂「戰爭是政治的延長 」,習當局何以花費巨資舉辦一個「白象軍演」,除了展示軍事即國力外,也要對內外炫耀中國國力在其領導下已代美國而起。筆者有以下幾方討論。        第一,在於威嚇西方陣營,閱兵口號反覆強調「反法西斯」,卻幾乎等同「反西方」。與會領袖以中、俄、朝為核心,外加伊朗與部分非洲強人政權,該國皆強化自我國族凝聚於強人之下,享有共同價值觀,這種掩耳盜鈴行為只是將自身獨裁合理化的幌子。對美日歐而言,這場閱兵縱使出動精銳,惟真正意義不在於軍力展示,而在於中國試圖透過敘事與場面,證明自己能號召另一套國際秩序,向民主同盟正面下戰帖。對台灣來說,這意味著國際戰線的壓力將更加集中。        第二,令人狐疑者,中國經濟正陷入多重困境,如房市泡沫、青年失業、地方債壓力沉重。即便如此,北京仍砸重金舉辦閱兵。原因有三:一是「維穩至上」,以民族主義熱潮壓制內部不滿;二是「轉移焦點」,將社會視線從經濟困局拉向「國威」;三是「對台恫嚇」,利用排場營造「統一不可逆」的氛圍,強化其統治正當性。閱兵看似氣勢恢宏,其實是「煙火政治」,瞬間耀眼、又花費巨資,無非重現毛時代壯舉,毛澤東邀請赫路雪夫及金日成共赴天安門閱兵,試圖強化習與毛澤東之歷史連結,意味著近期外界推測習失勢傳聞恐為不真,反而進一步強化個人威望。       第三係台灣層面,此番藍營以亦有人受邀赴中,是否淪為統戰活教材?其實最不該赴會者應為藍營人士,其以戰勝日本的歷史為精神號召,眾所皆知帶領中國人民打贏日本者捕是國府嗎?中共藉由國府衰弱之際起兵奪取政權,如今,藍營自豪擁有百年黨史及抗戰榮耀,卻甘為曾經敵人作背書,遮羞對岸內戰奪權的晦暗不堪,宛如受虐者迎合施虐者的鞭苔、多麼諷刺。         更甚者,當藍營人士親臨,北京隨即將畫面包裝為「台灣內部分歧」的象徵,用來削弱台灣對外的一致形象。短期而言,藍營此舉或能迎合深藍選票、藉口為了和平,但長遠看卻加深其在本土認同上的裂縫。尤其在賴清德總統明確宣示「侵略註定失敗」之際,藍營卻選擇站在閱兵舞台旁,形同自陷「親中陷阱」。藍營若仍寄望透過「對岸善意」換取和平紅利,將不得不回答一個尖銳問題,即當北京把閱兵當作統戰工程時,你的和平框架如何自圓其說?即使無下限輸誠,然對岸對台的軍事壓力、經濟制裁與國際孤立卻一點都不能少,沒有對等認同與堅實國防能力,任何交流都將淪為北京的統戰宣傳。         九三閱兵的本質,是中國內部經濟、黨內問題的外部化。它或許能暫時製造民族亢奮,但無法掩蓋貧富懸殊與中美對立。對台灣而言,最佳回應不是被威嚇嚇倒,而是讓民主治理與社會韌性成為日常工程。唯有如此,才能讓北京的軍事秀淪為虛張聲勢,讓威權的表演在台灣民主面前,無法撼搖民心。 作者 / 風林火山

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