China has consistently asserted that Taiwan is part of its territory and that reunification is inevitable. This position is not new, but in recent years Beijing has repeated it with increasing frequency and intensity. Chinese officials describe Taiwan as an “inalienable part of China” and frame the issue as an internal matter, rejecting any form of international involvement. Alongside this narrative, the question that draws the most concern is not whether China wants reunification, but when and under what conditions it might resort to military force.
Beijing officially maintains that it prefers “peaceful reunification,” yet it has never renounced the use of force. Instead, military action is deliberately left as an option, serving both as deterrence and coercion. Large-scale military exercises around Taiwan, frequent air and naval incursions, and increasingly explicit warnings are designed to normalize pressure and test Taiwan’s responses without crossing the threshold of open war.
The timing of a potential military move is shaped by several factors. Domestically, China’s leadership must balance nationalism, economic stability, and regime legitimacy. Externally, Beijing closely watches Taiwan’s political direction, especially any move perceived as formal independence, as well as the level of U.S. and allied support for Taiwan. Military readiness, economic resilience under sanctions, and global geopolitical distractions also weigh heavily in Beijing’s calculations.
Rather than a fixed timetable, China’s strategy appears to be conditional. Force is framed as a last resort triggered by specific red lines, such as a declaration of independence or irreversible international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. Until then, Beijing relies on sustained political, economic, and psychological pressure to weaken Taiwan’s resolve and shape international perceptions.
In short, China’s constant emphasis that Taiwan “belongs to China” is less about announcing an imminent invasion and more about maintaining long-term strategic leverage. The real risk lies not in a sudden decision detached from context, but in miscalculation, escalation, or a belief in Beijing that the strategic window has become too favorable to ignore.
