Since Cheng Li-wun became chair of the Kuomintang (KMT), the party has taken a visibly sharper pro-China direction. Her repeated emphasis on engaging Beijing, affirming the 1992 Consensus, and expressing willingness to meet Chinese leaders has strengthened perceptions that the KMT is aligning too closely with China’s political narrative. For Taiwan’s swing voters—who determine the outcome of most elections—this shift is deeply unsettling.
Swing voters in Taiwan generally support stable cross-strait relations, but they also prioritize security, democratic autonomy, and a clear Taiwanese identity. They are open to economic cooperation with China yet firmly reject political frameworks that appear to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. When Cheng or her appointed deputies make statements echoing Beijing’s terminology—such as referring to Taiwan as a “region” of the PRC—it reinforces fears that the KMT is drifting away from mainstream public opinion.
This creates a strategic dilemma for the party. While the pro-China tilt may energize traditional blue-camp loyalists, it risks driving moderates, independents, and younger voters toward rival parties. The Democratic Progressive Party, in turn, benefits whenever the KMT is portrayed as out of touch with Taiwan’s political realities.
If Cheng continues on this path, the KMT may consolidate its old base but lose the centrist electorate essential for winning national and local elections. To remain competitive, the party must recalibrate its messaging and demonstrate that engagement with China will not come at the expense of Taiwan’s autonomy. Without such adjustments, Cheng Li-wun’s approach could further marginalize the KMT among the voters who matter most.
Author: Cathy Lin
