Leaving aside, for the moment, the near- and long-term internal and external causes of the current constitutional predicament of the “Republic of China on Taiwan,” it must be said that—looking back with hindsight—the DPP government should, at the latest, have taken action when the amended and deteriorated version of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act was passed and sent out of the Legislative Yuan late last year. At that point, the government should have refused promulgation or countersignature and should have launched a full legal and political confrontation with the blue-white camp, which, under the pretense of “oversight,” has in fact sought to paralyze Taiwan’s existing system and benefit hostile forces. Doing so would have bought time for the Constitutional Court to resolve its own institutional crisis. Instead, action was delayed until now—after the Constitutional Court has been effectively paralyzed for a full year and more than 400 constitutional interpretation petitions have piled up—before finally deciding to exercise constitutional authority and resist. Even so, this is still better than doing nothing at all, passively waiting for total institutional decay, or politically “waiting for death.”

Among the options currently available, the approach of “the President promulgating the law pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of China, while the Premier and/or the relevant ministers refuse to countersign” appears to be the least legally controversial. At that point, however, the pressure would shift back to the Legislative Yuan. The blue-white majority there would have very limited options: either to invoke Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution and propose a vote of no confidence against the Premier, or to accept the situation and tolerate the refusal to countersign, resulting in the law failing to take effect as usual.

Let us assume that the blue-white camp does initiate and pass a no-confidence motion against the Premier. Given the current political climate—and considering that the DPP government has, for more than a year approaching two years, been constrained by the blue-white parties’ actions that have gone far beyond the bounds of reasonable legislative oversight, even entering a new phase of what might be called “smashing the prosecution, judiciary, and rule of law with blue-white characteristics”—it is difficult to imagine Premier Cho Jung-tai simply resigning to the President without seizing the opportunity for an early legislative election. If the legislature were dissolved and elections held anew, and if Taiwanese public judgment and civic awareness were to return to a more normal state, it would be highly uncertain whether the blue-white parties could retain a legislative majority. Therefore, unless the blue-white camp is absolutely confident of victory—and unless the Chinese party-state authorities behind them at least do not oppose, or even covertly support, such an electoral gamble—it is unlikely that they would willingly destroy the defensive wall of their current majority. The most probable outcome would instead be reluctant acceptance and a prolonged political stalemate with the DPP government.

During such a stalemate, the blue-white camp may adopt several tactics:

— Leveraging pro-blue traditional media and emerging social media platforms to normalize the DPP government’s use of countersignature authority as a countermeasure to legislative abuse of power, while distorting this situation domestically and internationally as evidence of “authoritarianism under the Lai administration,” and exaggerating the alleged harms caused by “bad laws failing to leave the legislature.”

— At the same time, demanding that the Lai government promptly fill the seven vacant seats on the Constitutional Court in order to restore its capacity for constitutional review, thereby relieving the legislature from its own impasse.

— In addition, the blue-white camp may use municipalities and counties where they still hold executive power to create new obstacles for the central government through administrative inaction or dereliction of duty. The risk of an African swine fever outbreak nearly turning into a major disaster, followed by disruptions to Taiwan’s pork export recovery even after the situation was initially brought under control—along with the manipulation of public opinion by pro-blue old and new media—can be understood as a rehearsal for similar composite operations in the future. Such actions would also create internal resistance that undermines Taiwan’s ability to focus on responding to the threat posed by China.

Frankly speaking, the above analysis is not yet fully mature. Nevertheless, Taiwanese society as a whole must have more people who recognize the danger and act to remedy it as soon as possible. It is essential to see through the blue-white camp’s abuse of legislative power to carry out their overt schemes to harm Taiwan, weaken Taiwan, and facilitate China’s aggression. Only by sealing these institutional loopholes quickly can Taiwanese society return to a relatively normal and stable trajectory.

Author : Cathy Lin