社會觀察 . 獨立評論 . 多元觀點 . 公共書寫 . 世代翻轉

  • Home
  • English
  • 評論
  • 民意
  • 時事
  • 生活
  • 國際
  • 歷史
  • 世代
  • 吶喊廣場
  • 轉載
  • 投稿須知

Party Unity Is Paramount – A Lesson from the US

  • English Article
  • 時事
  • 民意

What’s worse: Nominating a candidate you don’t like (but many others do), who wins the election and continues the legacy of the party, or nominating one that you really like (but many others don’t), who loses?

Party unity is fundamentally important for anyone hoping to win an election. Just look at what happened to the Democrats during the 2016 presidential primary in the US: Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders (as well as their supporters) fought tooth and nail until the bitter end (when Clinton received the nomination), with the intra-party conflict dividing people ‘on the same team’ and perhaps contributing directly to the unthinkable, razor-thin loss in the general election to Donald Trump. Currently, there’s a similar drama unfolding within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) primary ahead of the 2020 presidential election in Taiwan, with incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen and challenger William Lai both bitterly vying for the nomination. The question we need to ask is: Is the situation in Taiwan equivalent to what happened in the US? And if so, what can be done about it?

DPP postponed the internal election for 2020 presidential election. Image Source: Yahoo Kimo
DPP postponed the internal election for 2020 presidential election. Image Source: Yahoo Kimo

In America, Clinton – like Tsai – was the assumed front runner for her party’s nomination, even before the primary began. This was mainly due to her exceptional name recognition, the fact that she represented the mainstream of the Democratic establishment, and the deep pockets she could leverage in support of her candidacy. The problem, however, was that Sanders appeared from out of nowhere and became an incredibly popular grass-roots candidate (like Trump), garnering massive crowds at rallies, energizing his base of left-wing populists, and drawing in other Democratic voters dissatisfied with Hillary’s neoliberal ideas and the Clinton political machine. For some members of the Democratic National Committee (DNC; the governing body of the Democratic Party), the situation became more of a headache as the surprisingly close primary dragged on. Although it was obvious, perhaps, to many Committee members that it was Hillary’s ‘time’ to run, Sanders wasn’t making things easy by being so damned popular among voters.

Perhaps it helped that her supporters held top positions at the DNC (in fact, former chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz resigned after leaked emails showed a bias against Sanders) and she had a favorable fundraising arrangement with the Committee, but in the end Clinton secured the nomination, prompting many of Sanders’ followers to cry foul at what they saw as the unfair treatment he received.

While many DNC officials were no doubt overjoyed that their preferred candidate – and not some old semi-independent socialist from outside their ranks – got the nod, that was before the general election, when – [cough] [cough] [cough] – Clinton lost to none other than the reality TV-star, narcissistic demigod Trump. Given that fact, I think it’s fair to wonder whether all those officials still believe they pushed for the right nominee, because, no matter how good it may feel for your guy (or girl) to triumph in the primary, it’s essentially worth zilch, nothing, nada, if he or she fails to beat the other dude in the main event. And the sad thing about the Clinton-Sanders saga – at least in the minds of many Democratic voters – is that the people in charge of the Democratic party seemed to have lost sight of that fact in the rush to have their candidate succeed.

Whether Sanders would have won the nomination outright if he’d had the same purported fundraising advantages and friends in high places that Clinton did is unlikely, but the truth is that he was polling better than her against Trump during much of the primary, which is notable given the general election results. Also, as it’s hard for voters to trust the democratic process if their party isn’t being, um, so democratic, it should come as no surprise that there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for Clinton leading up to the election. And this brings us to the remarkably similar political drama currently occurring in Taiwan.

According to some polls, Lai – the DPP challenger – would do better than Tsai against potential Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidates in 2020. Granted, the situation isn’t exactly the same as the one in the US, as Tsai is actually the president of the country, and therefore – it could be argued – should automatically get the nomination. The flaw in this line of reasoning, however, is that the quicksand of the political landscape always changes, and if the party – which is, by definition, greater than any single individual – fails to adapt, all may be lost. For example, the DPP got crushed in the 2018 municipal elections, which obviously doesn’t bode well for current party leadership in 2020. But be that as it may, the real issue here isn’t about the past, but the future, as – in the final analysis – it doesn’t really matter who the nominee is, as long as he or she is strongest one.

The biggest danger for the DPP right now is that the longer the primary process drags on (so far it’s been delayed by about two months), the more voters will suspect something fishy (i.e., non-democratic) is going on, leading to disillusionment among supporters of the ‘wronged’ candidate (think Sanders in 2016) and further damage to party unity. So if the DPP’s goal is to field the best candidate in 2020, it would be wise to carry out its opinion polling as soon as possible (it’s currently scheduled for June 10-14), the rules of which should be transparent and just for both participants, with the one who loses stepping aside, no matter how upsetting that may be.

After all, what’s worse: Nominating a candidate you don’t like (but many others do), who wins the election and continues the legacy of the party, or nominating one that you really like (but many others don’t), who loses? If you’re not sure what the answer to the this question is, just ask any Democratic voter who woke up on November 9th, 2016 to the news that Trump had somehow won the presidency, and has been dealing with the train-wreck of his administration every day for the past two-and-a-half years. They’ll probably tell you that – like the Chinese adage says – “When disaster befalls one, no one can escape unscathed.” (覆巢無完卵)

Author / Peter K. Thompson

Share this:

  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • Email
  • More
  • Tumblr
  • Pocket
  • Pinterest
  • LinkedIn

Related

DPP Trump Tsai Ing-wen 政治 民進黨
2019-06-01 Peter K. Thompson

Post navigation

我們都一樣 — 酒店公關啟示錄 (一) → ← 誠品成為箝制言論自由的幫兇

Related Posts

羅禮士逝世享壽86歲:從《德州騎警》到「Chuck Norris Facts」,一個迷因世代的硬漢告別

羅禮士(Chuck Norris)逝世、享壽86歲的消息,已由家屬透過社群貼文證實,主流媒體亦以美聯社報導跟進。 他的離去之所以在台灣與全球社群引發連鎖悼念,不只因為他是動作片與武術明星,更因為他在網路文化中被再創造成一種跨世代符號:把「不可戰勝」的硬漢形象,轉譯成可被分享、可被改寫、可被集體玩笑化的迷因資產。 在影視史的語境裡,羅禮士代表的是一種「不靠特效也能成立」的身體敘事。他的角色多半不是複雜心理戲,而是以紀律、力量、正邪分明的秩序感,去提供觀眾安全感。這種敘事在今日的串流時代看似老派,卻恰恰解釋了為什麼「Chuck Norris Facts」會爆紅:當世界越來越不確定,越多人願意用誇張笑話把確定性重新寫回來。那些「連眼淚都能治癌」或「時間會等他」的句型,本質不是相信超能力,而是用荒謬對抗焦慮,讓群體在同一個梗裡獲得共同節奏。 更值得注意的是,他的迷因化並沒有抹除他作為演員與武術家的「原始魅力」,反而把他推向新的公共領域:年輕人可能沒完整看過他的影集,卻能一眼辨識他的名字與形象;這是一種由網路完成的「文化續命」。當他離世,悼念也會呈現雙軌:一邊是對作品年代的回憶,一邊是對迷因時代的致敬。它提醒我們,名人不再只活在作品裡,也活在使用者的二創、轉發與集體語言裡。 羅禮士的落幕,象徵一個更深的變化:英雄敘事不會消失,但它會被重新包裝成可傳播的碎片。硬漢仍然需要,只是以笑話、貼圖與短句的形式,回到日常生活裡繼續發揮安定作用。 作者:新公民議會編輯小組

Anthropic拒絕美國政府「接管權」:超級AI治理的主權矛盾,從企業倫理到國家安全的拉鋸戰

當Anthropic傳出基於道德原則,拒絕美國政府要求取得其AI核心技術「完整控制權」時,外界第一反應往往是震驚:在AI被視為下一代國力的年代,企業怎敢對政府說不?但這起事件真正揭示的,不是單一公司與單一政府的衝突,而是2026年全球AI治理進入深水區後必然出現的「主權矛盾」:國家想握住開關,企業想守住底線,而社會最在意的其實是誰能避免AI被濫用。 政府的焦慮並不難理解。當模型能力逼近可自動化大量工作、影響輿論與資安攻防的等級,AI就不再只是商業產品,而是戰略資產。國安體系自然傾向建立「接管機制」:在緊急狀態、戰爭或重大風險情境下,政府可以直接介入模型的部署、權限與算力調度。從國家角度看,這是風險控管;但從民主社會角度看,這也可能打開另一扇門:若AI的能力被行政權直接握住,誰能保證它不會成為政治打壓、監控擴張或資訊戰的工具? Anthropic的拒絕,等於把討論焦點從「該不該管」推進到「怎麼管才不會失控」。企業宣稱的倫理紅線,表面上像是價值宣示,本質上卻是在防止一種治理路徑:把AI治理簡化為「主權化」或「準國有化」。一旦企業讓出完整控制權,模型的道德框架可能被改寫成政權需求,安全承諾也可能轉變成政治指令。這不只傷害企業信任,更會讓AI治理失去最重要的資產:可預測的規則與可被外部檢驗的程序。 對台灣而言,這場爭議的啟示更尖銳。台灣在AI供應鏈與地緣政治上高度依賴盟友架構,但若治理框架完全外包,台灣社會的價值排序—言論自由、程序正義、個資保護—就可能被迫讓位給他國的國安優先。真正務實的路線不是選邊站,而是建立可落地的制度防線:清楚界定政府介入的觸發條件、權限範圍、監督機制與事後責任;同時要求任何高風險模型在台部署時,具備可稽核的安全報告、外部審查與透明揭露。當治理能被制度鎖住,才不需要靠某一家企業的道德勇氣來擋住權力。 這起事件提醒所有民主社會:AI的危險不只在模型本身,而在「誰能無限制地使用它」。真正的AI治理,不是把開關交給誰,而是讓開關永遠受到制衡。 作者:新公民議會編輯小組

藍天生變!新北市長選戰「逆襲」背後的「鄭麗文效應」?

      2026年的大選鐘聲雖尚未正式敲響,但全台灣最大的票倉—新北市,卻已提前陷入一場波詭雲譎的政治大霧。就在三月初,權威民調機構「美麗島電子報」釋出的驚人數據,宛如投入平靜湖面的深水炸彈;民進黨呼聲最高的人選蘇巧慧,在支持度上竟與佔盡上風的國民黨「最強外援」李四川不分軒輊,令人好奇背後究竟何原因造成。觀目前我國政治局勢,仍由藍白合主導立院,持續遲延國家政策推動,本應使支持者大快人心的格局,如何出現微妙變化?如下,筆者將從各方面分析之。 黨魁「紅利」變「紅害」?鄭麗文的兩岸天平失衡        欲理解這場民調的「黃金交叉」,必須將視角抽離新北市,轉向位於八德路的國民黨中央。自鄭麗文接掌黨魁以來,其鮮明的「大兩岸政策」風格,在國際地緣政治劇烈變動的2026年,顯得格外突兀。儘管鄭麗文強調「拚和平、拚經濟」,並主張兩岸關係是台灣發展的「重中之重」,但在美中競爭白熱化、區域盟友連線轉趨強硬的當下,這種近乎「單向親中」的立場,已逐漸在新北的中間選民與青年族群中產生「外溢焦慮」。專家指出,新北市民中存在大量「經濟選民」與「白領中產」,他們對和平有渴望,但對「背離國際局勢」的政治傾斜極為敏感。鄭麗文在兩岸論述上的強勢與暴走,讓原本走溫和、務實路線的藍營地方首長,無端背負「紅標籤」的包袱。 地方派系的結構性隱憂      另一個推動民調逆轉的隱形動力,源自於國會內部的政治角力。近期,國民黨與地方派系在國會中針對預算分配與法案修訂的「聯手」,被綠營成功塑造成「分贓政治」的形象。當選民看到立法院內的藍營黨團,頻繁與各地方派系進行政治利益的交換,這種「派系共治國會」的既視感,直接抵銷了國民黨在新北市長期建立的行政專業形象。對於蘇巧慧而言,這無疑是天賜良機。其長期透過長期在教育與地方建設的耕耘,結合民進黨中央「穩定施政」的大環境紅利,暫時拉攏部分對「國會亂象」感到厭倦的中立選民。蘇巧慧的「精準逆襲」:從基層滲透到形象重塑      數據顯示,蘇巧慧在板橋、三重等傳統綠營優勢區的基礎穩固,更驚人的是,在過去李四川占優勢的「深藍區」如中永和,蘇的落後幅度正在縮小。這反映出蘇巧慧並非僅靠政黨色彩,而是利用「鄭麗文效應」帶來的品牌危機,精準切入。當國民黨的主軸逐漸脫離台灣主流民意,地方大選就不再只是修橋鋪路,而是台灣本土價值觀的保衛戰。       目前,民進黨正試圖將這股「有利環境」極大化,可策略性地將新北市長選舉定位為「國際觀與鎖國觀」的對決,並透過揭露藍營地方派系與國會資源的連動關係,瓦解藍營的組織優勢。蘇巧慧的民調直逼,與其說是綠營的強大,不如說是藍營在黨主席立場與國會運作上的失策,給了對手一個突破機會。 戰火邊緣的十字路口       新北選情的逆轉,是2026年全台政局的縮影。當國民黨試圖重回傳統兩岸路線時,卻忽略選民對於「權力分贓」與「地緣現實」的警覺。年底的這場仗,對蘇巧慧而言是「逆襲」的起點,而對國民黨來說,若不解決「黨中央與地方民意脫節」的系統性問題,新北這座藍營最後的堡壘,恐將在鄭麗文的個人意志下,隨風動搖。 作者 / 劍藏鋒

台灣為何難以孵育跨國消費品牌?從OEM結構、小市場到資本與通路的系統性障礙

台灣製造能力強,但能跨國擴張的消費性品牌卻不多,關鍵不在「台灣人不會做品牌」,而在產業分工與商業環境長期把企業推向「代工最優解」。政府與研究單位的中小企業白皮書指出,台灣企業以中小企業為主體,長期在全球供應鏈扮演ODM/OEM角色,競爭力集中在研發、製造與交期效率,而非面向終端消費者的品牌經營。 首先是市場結構:台灣內需規模有限,人口約2,300多萬,企業即使做到本地知名,也很難靠單一市場長期支撐「品牌出海」所需的行銷、人材與通路投入。 相比之下,美日歐的大市場允許品牌在國內先跑出規模、驗證產品定位,再用現金流與經驗外溢到海外;台灣企業更常被迫「一開始就出海」,但沒有足夠品牌資產與通路控制力,只能用價格與供貨能力切入,最後回到代工或B2B。 第二是資本與風險結構。消費品牌的獲利曲線通常是「前期重投入、後期吃品牌溢價」,早期會被行銷費、通路費、退換貨、在地法規與客服成本吞噬。台灣企業與資本市場長期更偏好可量化、可預期的製造訂單與B2B合約,因為現金流穩、擴產模型清楚;品牌則需要長時間投資「看不見的資產」(心智佔有率、社群口碑、設計語言),在短期財務報表上反而像拖累。結果是企業內部資源配置傾向把最強的人才投入製造與供應鏈,而不是品牌、內容、渠道與零售營運。 第三是通路與平台權力。跨國消費品牌的核心不是「賣出去一次」,而是掌握定價、渠道與用戶資料。台灣公司若以代工起家,往往缺乏自建海外D2C能力與本地化零售運營團隊,只能依賴大型平台、代理商與分銷體系。當渠道不在自己手上,品牌就很難累積會員資料、復購機制與售後服務品質,也很難在同一品類裡用產品迭代與內容運營建立護城河,最後被迫回到「比成本、比規格、比交期」。 第四是品牌組織能力的缺口。製造型組織擅長的是效率、良率、成本與交付;消費品牌擅長的是定位、敘事、設計、社群、體驗與口碑傳播。這兩種能力並非自然延伸,而是兩套不同的語言與決策系統。當企業文化以工程與供應鏈為中心,品牌部門往往缺乏決策權,難以在產品定義階段主導;等產品做出來再「補行銷」,通常已錯過建立差異化的最佳時機。 結論是:台灣不缺製造與技術,缺的是讓品牌能長期投資的制度與市場條件。若要提高孵化跨國消費品牌的成功率,方向不應停在口號式「做品牌」,而是把代工結構下的理性選擇改掉:降低品牌出海的通路摩擦(物流、退換貨、稅務合規、在地客服)、讓資本願意承擔較長的回收期、並在企業治理上把品牌視為核心資產而非行銷附屬。否則台灣仍會持續以全球最強供應鏈的姿態,替別人的品牌做大。 作者:新公民議會編輯小組

Recent Posts

羅禮士逝世享壽86歲:從《德州騎警》到「Chuck Norris Facts」,一個迷因世代的硬漢告別

羅禮士逝世享壽86歲:從《德州騎警》到「Chuck Norris Facts」,一個迷因世代的硬漢告別

羅禮士(Chuck Norris)逝世、享壽86歲的消息,已由家屬透過社群貼文證實,主流媒體亦以美聯社報導跟進。 他的離去之所以在台灣與全球社群引發連鎖悼念,不只因為他是動作片與武術明星,更因為他在網路文化中被再創造成一種跨世代符號:把「不可戰勝」的硬漢形象,轉譯成可被分享、可被改寫、可被集體玩笑化的迷因資產。 [...]

More Info
Anthropic拒絕美國政府「接管權」:超級AI治理的主權矛盾,從企業倫理到國家安全的拉鋸戰

Anthropic拒絕美國政府「接管權」:超級AI治理的主權矛盾,從企業倫理到國家安全的拉鋸戰

當Anthropic傳出基於道德原則,拒絕美國政府要求取得其AI核心技術「完整控制權」時,外界第一反應往往是震驚:在AI被視為下一代國力的年代,企業怎敢對政府說不?但這起事件真正揭示的,不是單一公司與單一政府的衝突,而是2026年全球AI治理進入深水區後必然出現的「主權矛盾」:國家想握住開關,企業想守住底線,而社會最在意的其實是誰能避免AI被濫用。 [...]

More Info
藍天生變!新北市長選戰「逆襲」背後的「鄭麗文效應」?

藍天生變!新北市長選戰「逆襲」背後的「鄭麗文效應」?

      [...]

More Info
台灣為何難以孵育跨國消費品牌?從OEM結構、小市場到資本與通路的系統性障礙

台灣為何難以孵育跨國消費品牌?從OEM結構、小市場到資本與通路的系統性障礙

台灣製造能力強,但能跨國擴張的消費性品牌卻不多,關鍵不在「台灣人不會做品牌」,而在產業分工與商業環境長期把企業推向「代工最優解」。政府與研究單位的中小企業白皮書指出,台灣企業以中小企業為主體,長期在全球供應鏈扮演ODM/OEM角色,競爭力集中在研發、製造與交期效率,而非面向終端消費者的品牌經營。 [...]

More Info

搜尋

精選文章

川習會的中美矛盾是戰略,不是貿易!

2017-04-08 韓非

八仙樂園爆炸案:缺乏常識造成的災難

2015-06-28 異想

彰化縣民輪替後的哀與愁

2016-03-06 許家瑋

新文明病:儲物症(Hoarding disorder)似正在增加

2015-04-13 楊庸一

訂閱本站

輸入你的電子郵件訂閱新文章並接收新通知。

Powered by WordPress | theme Dream Way
Powered by WordPress | theme Dream Way